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 This paper discusses news as a political resource for social movements. 
Specifically, the paper elaborates a conceptualization of news as a discursive resource, 
and suggests a dialogical  model for media-movement relationships. The paper then uses 
this framework to investigate U. S. women's movement groups interactions with news 
media. I describe how the two "branches" of the women's movement understood news 
differently and developed quite different and specific strategies which I call media 
pragmatism  and media subversion. The study raises questions not only about what kind 
of a resource news might be, and to whom it might be available, but also about the forms 
of knowledge that can be distributed widely in a society saturated with media "logics.” 
  Social movements, especially the "new" social movements such as the women's, 
environmental, and peace movements, have come to be seen as important transformative 
agents in modern societies (Touraine, 1985; Boggs, 1986; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). 
In particular, the feminist or women's movement, has been associated with fundamental 
challenges to traditional or "old" political distinctions, (such as that between public and 
private concerns), and with subtle, but radical extensions of what can even legitimately 
be considered a "political" issue (Habermas, 1981; Offe, 1985; Van Zoonen, 1994).  
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But we have less information about how  the new movements have created or 
communicated these new discourses. What are the concrete communication strategies 
involved in building and diffusing these new political identities? In particular, what 
role(s) have news media played in the mass communication of new social movement 
discourses? 
 In this paper I address some of the theoretical, strategic, and practical problems 
faced by social movements in their interactions with news media, first through a 
discussion of news as a political "resource," and then through a case study of how 
women's movement groups in the U. S. (1966-1975) experienced their relationships with 
news media. 
 The general, theoretical importance of news media to social movements seems 
clear. The way news media represent a social movement can affect their ability to 
mobilize members, to construct a viable public identity, or to build a public policy agenda 
(Gitlin, 1980; Hackett, 1991; Molotch, 1988). Indeed, the perception of a movement that 
most individuals are likely to hold is the movement's "public identity," and this is itself 
the outcome of media-movement interaction (Van Zoonen, 1992). However, we have less 
specific information about the ways in which these general processes work out (or not) 
for particular social movements in specific historical circumstances. For example, how 
have movement strategists themselves understood their interactions with media? What 
strategies have they developed to try to “use” media as a movement resource, and what 
has news access “cost” them? What kind of a resource has news been for specific social 
movements and why? 
 In this paper I address these questions to the groups that were active in the early 
years of the second wave women’s movement in the United States (1966-1975). I 
describe how the two "branches" of the women's movement understood news differently 
and developed quite different and specific strategies to deal with news media. These 
strategies, which I call media pragmatism  and media subversion, were in turn related to 
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the groups’ available resources, their media skills, and their political identities more 
generally. The paper draws on the historical papers of the National Organization for 
Women, on accounts of the early movement by activists and historians, and on accounts 
of covering the movement by women journalists.1 
 
 THEORY: NEWS AS A POLITICAL RESOURCE 
 For the most part, studies of news as a political resource have focused on 
institutional, usually state, but sometimes also corporate sources. Gandy (1982, p. 198), 
for example, has argued convincingly for the importance of information as a political 
resource for both public and private organizations. Those organizations that can produce 
and distribute reliable information to others are seen to be "subsidizing" decision-making 
in their favor. Because such information is the raw material of news making, 
organizations who make information available to journalists are “subsidizing” the 
construction of news stories in their interests. As Gandy explains, “An information 
subsidy increases the demand for certain information by lowering its price to the 
consumer... The journalist's costs of producing news are reduced through a variety of 
techniques utilized by sources to manage the information market.” 
 In this framework, news is a political resource, first, because access to 
information at all is directly related to other material resources (such as the labor, skills 
and money to create or process it). Secondly, providing information to others structures 
their decision-making (Gandy, 1982, p. 198). 
 But news is not only a channel for the transmission of information. It is also a 
complex, knowledge-producing system in itself, with its own conventions, practices and 
"logics" (Van Dijk, 1988; Hartley, 1982; Altheide and Snow, 1979).  In particular, news 
discourse is a privileged form of knowledge in political life. It is generally considered to 
be an authoritative version of reality, a way of knowing associated with high levels of 
cultural legitimacy.  As such, news offers sources another form of power beyond the 
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chance to distribute interested information; it offers membership in a group of “knowers.”  
It is this association with authority that, according to Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989, 
pp. 3-4), makes news a form of cultural capital  for its regular sources: 
  News is a representation of authority. In the contemporary knowledge  
  society news represents who are the authorized knowers and what are their  
  authoritative versions of reality.... It indicates who is in possession of  
  knowledge as "cultural capital," and thereby articulates who are members  
  of the "new class" who derive their labour and property membership from  
  the production, distribution and administration of knowledge. 
 In this knowledge/power framework, representation in news -- in fact a particular 
kind of representation, voice as opposed to coverage -- confers authority on the source, 
because news itself has come to hold a special place as an authoritative version of reality.  
  News is a political resource, then, in that it is a modality  of power. News voice  
translates into legitimacy in the knowledge system for the speaker, and news’ distributive 
capacity allows the speaker to communicate that knowledge widely, and so structure the 
public information environment. In media-saturated societies, voice in the news is a key 
part of making one's "account count" in the public sphere . 
  
 News as a Social Movement Resource 
 But how does such a relationship work out for social movements? The 
organizations that Ericson et al. (1989) and Gandy (1982) refer to are usually either state 
or corporate bureaucratic organizations, who have access to resources, and to whom 
legitimacy in the existing political configuration is a clear goal. Yet even for these 
powerful sources, access to news, and especially voice  in the news, constitutes a daily 
struggle (Ericson et al., 1989; Schlesinger, 1990).  
 What difference does it make when sources are challenging or critical, when they 
are under-resourced, or when their knowledge is new or in forms that may not merge well 
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with traditional news forms? Can social movements be understood as sources in the same 
way that institutional sources are?  Is news likely to be a form of cultural capital for 
social movements? And, if so, is it one that they can afford? 
 Based on his case study of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Gitlin (1980, 
p. 281), of course,  has argued forcefully that news will never adequately carry social 
movement discourses because of the economic, organizational, and ideological 
connections that news organizations and news discourses have to dominant power 
relations in society.  Though movements will be attracted to commercial news media as a 
way of "getting the word out," Gitlin concludes that news media are likely to cover them 
and their concerns in ways that will be counter-productive to critical social change. He 
argues that commercial media, through their professional "routines" and practices -- 
which are themselves embedded in capitalist and profit-oriented ideologies -- will serve 
to "frame" critical social movements and their activities in trivializing or marginalizing 
ways. In this hegemonic model, news media are central players in the systematic 
suppression of critical voices:  
  ....an opposition movement is caught in a fundamental and inescapable  
  dilemma. If it stands outside the dominant realm of discourse, it is liable to  
  be consigned to marginality and political irrelevance; its issues are 
  domesticated, it's deeper challenge to the social order sealed off, 
trivialized  
  and contained. If, on the other hand it plays by conventional political rules  
  in order to acquire an image of credibility -- if, that is, its leaders are well- 
  mannered, its actions well-ordered, and it's slogans specific and  
  "reasonable" -- it is liable to be assimilated into the hegemonic political 
   world view; it comes to be identified with narrow (if important) reform  
  issues, and its oppositional edge is blunted.  
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 But Gitlin's conclusions may be too much too soon. SDS was one, early, and 
relatively short-lived organization whose own development of media strategies was quite 
limited. But more importantly, the reform or revolution dichotomy that Gitlin invokes 
here, in which movements will either  be marginalized if they are radical or  incorporated 
if they are liberal, raises further difficulties. This approach begs the question of how we 
come to know what movements "are" at all. As Melucci (1985, p. 792) has observed, 
though historians and observers often talk about "movements" as if they were already 
constituted entities, who act in coherent ways, in fact "movements" are social 
constructions that are created and maintained through communication practices across 
time. And one of the forces with which movements interact in forming identities, are 
media themselves. As Van Zoonen (1994) has suggested, it is not really a question of 
whether news covers a “given” (liberal or radical) social movement in a "true" way or 
not, but of how the various "identities," strategies and organizational practices of a 
movement interact with the complex, though structured, selection "rules" of news media 
to create particular outcomes.  
 Perhaps the most limiting aspect of a closed hegemonic model such as Gitlin 
suggests, is that it seems to deny the reflexivity or strategic agency on the part of social 
movement actors themselves to learn about and strategically use dominant systems and 
discourses -- in this case journalistic routines and practices -- as resources themselves.2 
Movements can, potentially at least, learn about news organizations’ routines, practices 
and discursive logics, and take part in framing  themselves. 
 Giddens (1984) has suggested that this kind of reflexivity --  the ability to access 
and discursively use the “rules”  as resources -- is itself a fundamental aspect of human 
agency, and one that challenges deterministic explanations for human practices in many 
different circumstances. In the context of social movements, media and social change, 
this reflexivity and strategic use of constraints by movements may sometimes make news 
discourse a movement resource. Indeed in a more recent study of movement-media 
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interaction, for example, Ryan (1991) suggests that through the reflexive and strategic 
use of the very journalistic routines that Gitlin credits with destroying the student 
movement, "challenging" groups can begin to strategically "frame" themselves in 
newsworthy and culturally resonant ways.3 
 A radical/reformist framework gives us only two "outcome" possibilities, 
(trivialization or incorporation) for what is a complex, communicative interaction 
between two sets of organizations and discourses across time. But social change, 
especially ideological change, is never such an all or nothing process.4 As Boggs (1986, 
p. 4) has expressed it, strategic communication of new knowledges, of new ways of 
knowing, and of alternative articulations of social relations by social movements may 
have subtle and unintended effects: 
  ...[T]he fact that they [the new social movements] have nowhere  
  overturned the status quo should not obscure their historical  
  importance in posing new issues, shaping consciousness,  
  and opening new areas of political discourse. Indeed, many  
  time-honored debates have already been fundamentally 
  recast in both substance and tone. 
 
 Towards a Dialogical Model 
 The media-movement relationship can perhaps best be characterized as dialogical 
-- that is, as an interactive, reflexive, relationship that takes place over time. It is a 
relationship in which both media workers and movement strategists are knowledgeable, 
strategic agents, seeking to learn about and use each other's discourse. Such learning, and 
the incorporation of that knowledge into future interactions, can be seen as a form of 
strategic interaction  (cf. Goffman, 1969; Habermas, 1984).5 
 Understanding the media-movement relationship as a dialogical one, opens up our 
understanding of media and movements from one of “coverage” -- in which news 
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representations of social movements are (implicitly at least) compared to some ideal 
representation of reality --  into one in which two sets of actors are seen to be working 
within constraints to create and recreate different constructions of reality. It also focuses 
our attention on the medium of such relationships: information, knowledge and 
meanings. 
 Seeing the media-movement relationship as two-way does not preclude an 
imbalanced interaction, nor deny that one organization holds more power than the other. 
Movements are always likely to be less well resourced than either news organizations or 
the other corporate or state sources with which they compete for news access. Becoming 
involved in interaction with news media at all, will certainly cost resources that 
movements can ill afford. And, perhaps most critically, it is also likely to involve 
ideological costs -- framing a critical discourse successfully for news consumption may 
mean re-framing it in crucial ways. But to say that a relationship is difficult, complex, 
subtle, and unbalanced is not to say that its outcomes are inevitable. As Hackett (1991, p. 
281) notes in his conclusion to a study of the Canadian press and peace movement, using 
news may be an uphill battle for challengers but its outcomes are by no means 
predetermined: “The press is not a level playing field, but sometimes it is possible, even 
playing uphill, to score points, to win a match, and perhaps occasionally even to redefine 
the rules of the game. 
 When we see movements and media engaged in strategic interaction, or dialogical 
struggle, instead of inquiring how a movement is covered by the news organizations, we 
can ask: How do movement strategists and journalists interact? How have movement 
organizations understood news as a resource and how have they experienced its 
constraints, both in terms of the “cost” of accessing news and in constraining their 
identity formation? What strategies have they developed to control their interactions with 
news media and how have those strategies fared in interaction with news media routines 
and processes? In short, what has  worked and what hasn’t? A dialogical understanding 
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may produce critical or strategic  knowledge, knowledge that may be used to produce 
change. 
 In the next section, I address some of these strategic questions to the concrete 
historical experiences of different groups in the U. S.  women’s movement 1966-1975. 
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PRACTICE: MEDIA STRATEGIES IN THE U. S. WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
 The early women's movement in the United States was made up of a loosely 
organized and highly differentiated set of individuals, texts and organizations. Many 
different kinds of women's groups formed and reformed, organizing around various 
feminist principles and practices. Some of these groups were in contact with each other, 
others operated only in their own locality (Freeman, 1975; Echols, 1989).  
 Freeman (1975, p. 50), an early movement activist and historian, has suggested 
that we can best understand the complexity of the early women's movement if we think of 
it as breaking down very generally into a "younger" and an "older" branch.6 The "older" 
branch of the movement was made up of national organizations, such as the National 
Organization for Women (NOW), National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), 
Women's Equity Action League (WEAL), and so on. They tended to focus on political 
action in the public domain, to be organized around a democratically elected Board and 
to have some paid staff. NOW had both a national office and a coordinated set of local 
"chapters" in towns and cities around the country.  
 Generally speaking, in the early years the older branch saw themselves as 
pressuring the political system and fighting to bring women into the power structure. 
NOW, for example, in its organizing statement said that it had formed in 1966 in order to 
“take action to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of American society 
now, exercising all the privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partnership 
with men.”7 
 The "younger" branch of the movement was a more loosely organized plethora of 
different, often local, groups whose activities varied from consciousness-raising to 
political "zaps" and protests, and who experimented with alternative forms of association. 
To the younger groups, personal transformation was as important as public change and 
they tried to embody their politics in practice through problematizing issues of hierarchy, 
specialization, and routinization. They tried to invent new forms of association which 
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were leaderless and "structureless" because they were concerned that any form of 
traditional organization or leadership would "mimic" patriarchal power structures. They 
were almost always women-only groups.(Joreen, 1973, Freeman, 1975; Koedt et al. 
1973, Evans, 1979).  
 These general differences in articulations of feminism and in organizational logics 
were reflected in the communication practices and media relations of the two "branches." 
NOW held a pragmatic and strategic view of media in which they sought to learn about 
and use media as a political tool. The younger branch had more complicated and 
antagonistic relations with journalists in which they tried to make news workers conform 
to their organizational and political identities.  
 Both of these positions required that feminist activists understand news media -- 
whether to subvert it or to use it -- and both branches spent considerable time and energy 
on the "question of media." I call these two different media strategies media pragmatism 
and media subversion.  
  
 Media Pragmatists: The National Organization for Women 
 The "older" branch, as exemplified by the National Organization for Women, saw 
themselves as spokespersons for the movement, as a sort of vanguard who could speak to 
media and policy makers on behalf of a group called "women."  They were mostly 
women who had worked in traditional political organizations before -- many of them had 
been part of Kennedy's Presidential Commission on the Status of Women -- and they 
were comfortable with themselves in the role of "leaders" of a civil rights organization 
who could speak "for" its more general membership : “As a militant civil rights 
organization, NOW must speak out on news events related to the drive for equality 
between men and women.”8 
 From the beginning NOW saw media, especially the national, elite, news media, 
as a powerful movement resource. They sought to use news media to mobilize new 
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members and to win public approval, while also giving the public an "honest" picture of 
the movement: 
  Our major goals in press relations are threefold: 
  1. To build NOW and the movement by reaching and  
  recruiting prospective adherents. 
  2. To win political and community support for our  
  goals. 
  3. To give the general public an honest picture of  
  the Feminist Movement.9 
 If there is a hint of naiveté in this statement that they could use media to present 
an "honest" picture of the movement, it was not born of ignorance. NOW's national 
leadership was well versed in media skills from the beginning. The early Board members 
who were not lawyers were often communications professionals, such as writers, public 
relations specialists or journalists, and after the first few struggling years the organization 
had paid information staff. 
 Media Kits 
 Through the development of "Media Kits" in which they laid out strategies for 
dealing with news media, these national leaders sought to make the whole organization 
media-literate was. The kits were then distributed to the local chapters of the organization 
for use by local feminist activists. In this way the organization's national or central 
resources  -- professional communications specialists on the board and paid public 
information workers -- was distributed back to the localities. 
 Advice in the kits ranged from the pedantic to the sophisticated, from suggesting 
that local activists prepare a handout so that reporters get the facts straight, to advising 
that cake and coffee are optional at press conferences . In general they stressed 
understanding both the day-to-day practices of journalists and also understanding how 
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news discourse was structured, through trying to predict what would make something 
"newsworthy": 
  The beginning of a survey of employment practices may or may not be  
  news -- but the conclusion will be. A charge that some company 
  discriminates against a woman may or may not be news -- but the  
  announcement that an EEOC complaint has been filed will be. A speaker 
at a  
  meeting will not be news - unless she or he is a well known personality. In  
  the final analysis it's a trial and error game.10 
The media kits suggested that local chapters should designate press representatives whose 
job would be to get to know reporters and to coordinate media relations, and urged local 
activists to "think of yourself as a kind of editor" when planning events and activities.11  
 In addition to these kits for local activists, the central communications workers 
also produced many different kinds of information packages for reporters, sent out press 
releases and also at one point attempted an ongoing NOW News Service. 12 These 
"backgrounder" packages had direct advocacy purposes -- NOW hoped to encourage 
coverage of issues and events that they thought were important --  but they also carried 
much general (and useful) background information and research representing significant 
work on NOW's part.13 
  
 National NOW and Women Reporters 
 NOW were involved in relationships with many different kinds of media 
organizations. They tried, and succeeded, for example, in placing speakers on major talk-
shows, and they had ongoing relationships with editors and writers at women's 
magazines. But news media, especially elite national media, were always an important 
target . 
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 At the national level one of NOW's key strategies was to try to build a network of 
"women's issue" reporters from among sympathetic women on the elite press. There was 
a small cadre of such reporters, who from the early days recognized the importance of the 
movement -- at least it's more "liberal" or equality-type concerns -- as legitimate. NOW 
media strategists kept these reporters "up to date" and connected to what the movement 
was doing, by sending them information and research, by setting up interviews with the 
movement's leaders, and even taking them to lunch.  
 Building relationships with journalists and providing information for them is of 
course what all sources try to do, but NOW seemed to also be concerned with the 
position of women reporters in their own institutions, recognizing that in order for them 
to do any stories on the movement, they would need to be supported from outside with 
reliable information and friendly sources. In fact NOW often saw themselves as being in 
the business of educating or “raising the consciousness” of reporters as much as any other 
group of women. 14The women journalists who comprised NOW's informal "women's 
issue" beat worked for such prestigious news outlets as The New York Times  and The 
Washington Post. However, they often had to fight with their editors to cover the 
movement, or else they ended up covering women’s politics in their spare time or on a 
"volunteer basis" after work (Robertson 1992, p. 15).  
 For the most part editors at the elite press took a long time to be persuaded that 
women’s politics were really “news.” Peggy Simpson (1979, p. 21),  for example, recalls 
her early covering of the movement as one in which her attempts to become an expert 
were constantly thwarted by lack of support and resources from editors: “Clearly my 
editors and other media executives did not consider the women's political movement to 
be a bona fide story meriting continuing and expert coverage. Other reporters were 
getting the same signal.” Marilyn Goldstein (North, 1970, p. 105) who wrote a series on 
the movement in its early days for Newsday , also remembers that her editor cut out much 
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of her explanatory material on the movement, and told her to "find an authority who'll say 
this is all a crock of shit."  
 Despite these setbacks, it was mostly this small group of women who wrote what 
little news there was about the movement in its early days. Though these women were 
sympathetic to women's issues as news, they did  not always consider themselves 
feminists. As Peggy Simpson (1979, p. 21) recalls: “I thought of myself not as a feminist 
but as a reporter covering a good story that for some reason almost all of my male 
colleagues had ignored.” 
 The women were on one level simply acting like journalists -- developing a group 
of "expert" sources. But they were at least able to see women's issue news as news, and 
NOW as a credible source, which was more than their male colleagues or editors had 
done. Whether or not the women reporters felt themselves to be feminists, then, they 
brought  their professional judgment to bear on feminist information. They were able to 
use the routines of journalism -- and perhaps also to use the rhetorical strategy of a 
"good" story  -- to cover issues that were also important to them personally. 
 NOW's role here was as a provider of alternative knowledge, as the research and 
production department for the women reporters. Without a supportive "expert" source 
network these women might never have convinced their editors that women's issues were 
news at all. As Simpson (1979, p. 20) points out when remembering her early work life in 
Texas, if research and arguments are not made available to journalists by sources they are 
unlikely to come up with it themselves:  
  At that time I had not reported on any major elements of the early 
women's  
  liberation marches and had never met anyone who called herself a 
feminist.  
  I did know a lobbyist from the Texas chapter of Business and Professional  
  Women who was unsuccessfully trying to get a state Equal Rights 
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  Amendment passed. She never approached me, during my two terms  
  covering the Texas Legislature, and I never called her, so a persuasive 
state  
  senator easily convinced me that women would be in terrible straits if 
Texas  
  protective labor laws and community property laws were altered by the 
  ERA.  
 Besides supplying journalists with information, NOW also monitored much of the 
press coverage of the movement and its concern. They would compile updates on how 
the organization and its issues were being represented and use that information to 
restructure their media strategies or public identity. A typical example of such monitoring 
took place after the NOW national convention in 1973 when the NOW Public 
Information Office collected coverage from the national press and asked all chapters to 
send in their local coverage for analysis. The resulting analysis was published within the 
organization and became part of future strategizing efforts.15 It is this kind of reflexive 
process, in which an organization can analyze its own representation and so shift its 
communication strategies, that illustrates the essentially dialogical nature of the media-
movement relationship. 
 
 "Costs" and "Benefits" of Media Pragmatism 
 To some extent, NOW succeeded in becoming one of the key sources in an 
informal "women's issue" beat in Washington in the seventies (Simpson, 1979; 
Robertson, 1992). In early stories about "women's rights" issues and legislation or policy 
on discrimination,  NOW was often the feminist group cited. 
 But this embedding of news discourse conventions into their articulations also 
"cost" them not only in skills, labor and time, but also in the range of topics they could 
comfortably address. They had to be vigilant in all media interactions. Knowing what 
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would set off media meant that they would try to preempt journalists. This attempt to 
control communication to media -- though not untypical of organizations in successful 
interaction with journalists  -- was problematic for a social movement. 16As a part of a 
new and critical movement, NOW was often criticized inside the movement for being too 
cautious. In particular early NOW leaders were very sensitive to questions and debate on 
sexuality : 
  [W]e do know that questions involving the sexual and social relationships  
  between men and women are especially sensitive and especially 
susceptible  
  to ridicule by the press. Special caution must be observed in statements 
that  
  go beyond official NOW policy in this area.17 
 Ironically of course, the "social and sexual relationships between men and 
women" -- and indeed the social and sexual relationships between women and women -- 
were, and remain, at the heart of feminist concerns. To restrict talk on such issues was to 
opt out of an important part of the domain of personal politics that has been the hallmark 
of the feminist movement. NOW gained a reputation in its early years in the movement as 
anti-lesbian because recognizing or talking about lesbianism would cause them "image 
problems." Rita Mae Brown described NOW's position on lesbianism in her resignation 
from the organization in 1970 (cited in Phelan, 1989, p. 38): 
  Lesbianism is the one word that can cause the Executive Committee a 
  collective heart attack. This issue is dismissed as unimportant, too  
  dangerous to contemplate, divisive or whatever excuse could be dredged 
up  
  from their repression. The prevailing attitude is ... "Suppose they (notice  
  the word, they) flock to us in droves? How horrible. After all think of our  
  image." 
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Later, especially after 1975, as the younger branch groups disappeared, NOW itself 
became the site for serious struggle over what the public identity of feminism would be in 
the United States and as a consequence became much more open to, and representative 
of, women of all feminist identities.18 
 It is difficult to say, exactly, of course, how much of NOW's discursive choices 
were affected by media logics. It is possible that NOW's original leaders shared certain 
values with the mostly white, mostly middle class professional women journalists with 
whom they interacted anyway. To the professional middle class women who made up 
NOW's early membership and board, liberal news discourse conventions may not have 
seemed so unusual. And in some ways the aims of NOW and of media coincided. NOW 
saw itself as an action group and the media's focus on their activities rather than their 
ideology was no surprise to them. But it is clear that for NOW as an organization media 
was a central concern. From the beginning they invested resources and skills in media as 
an important mobilizing tool. They set out to "use" it and in their own eyes it was often a 
useful resource. 
 
 Media Subversives: The Younger Branch 
 The "younger" branch had more antagonistic relations with news media. Their 
relationship with reporters was more likely to be hostile than helpful because they 
associated news with other political institutions that had marginalized women's concerns 
(Freeman, 1975; North, 1970).  
 For the "younger" movement groups, media became intertwined with more 
general issues of power and representation within their organizations. Issues of who 
should or could speak FOR the movement and who should be seen [if anybody] as 
leaders of the movement were issues that were always problematic for the movement, but 
which interaction with media exacerbated. In their attempts to deconstruct patriarchal 
systems, younger movement groups (such as New York Radical Women, Redstockings, 
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Women's Liberation) often equated bureaucratization or specialization with patriarchal 
forms of organization and refused to have either designated leaders, or spokespersons, 
preferring to have a "structureless" organization in which each individual would "speak 
for herself" (Joreen, 1973).  
 These organizational structures made the search for news sources difficult for 
journalists. The same search for authoritative sources that women journalists had been 
able to satisfy by talking to NOW, led journalists into trouble with the younger 
movement groups. As a women's liberation member said to reporter Sandie North (1970, 
p. 105), when she tried to find a movement spokesperson, “Any woman working in the 
media can write about her own oppression as a woman, so why should the press need to 
talk to any of us?” 
 However, asking a journalist to speak in her own voice in the 1970s was not 
particularly helpful advice. There were still few women reporters in the major news 
organizations, and rather than invent new forms of journalism, these women were often 
expected to satisfy more rigid standards of sourcing than their male colleagues because of 
sexist perceptions of women as less competent journalists (Hoffman, 1970).  
 Neither could a journalist realistically take the other option and speak to everyone 
in the movement or even to everyone in an organization, and just as reporters did with the 
student movement, journalists sought out and made their own "leaders" of the liberation 
movement. As Echols (1989, p. 209) notes, these strategies often had unintended 
consequences: “Ironically, the movement's self-imposed silence empowered the media, 
allowing them to choose Gloria Steinham -- a talented journalist sympathetic to 
feminism, but a virtual unknown in movement circles -- as a movement spokesperson.” 
 Whereas NOW had built into their organizational identity the role of 
spokesperson, the younger movement could not easily compromise on the issue. Central 
to their critique of patriarchal ways of knowing and representing others, was their belief 
in the importance of knowledge gained from personal experience. They had seen too 
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often in the past how women had been spoken "about" and "for" by male voices. In 
particular they valued personal testimony or experiences of oppression that had not been 
able to be spoken before. By asking reporters to listen to a wide variety of women, or 
indeed to listen to themselves, they were expressing a key tenet of their feminism, but it 
was not one that fit easily with news conventions. 
 Women Only 
 The conflict between the younger groups’ articulations of feminism and news 
discourse conventions manifested itself again quite clearly when women's groups began a 
policy of speaking only to women reporters and excluding male journalists from their 
events and conferences. Starting at the 1968 Miss America protest -- when women 
demonstrators from New York Radical Women (NYRW) simply refused to speak to male 
reporters or to answer them explaining, "Why should we talk with them? It's impossible 
for men to understand” -- this policy soon became an informal rule among many women's 
groups.  
 The women's groups involved hoped that their separatist strategy  would make it 
easier to deal with the press, (which would result in better coverage), and that it might 
also force the news media to hire more women journalists. They had seen how the Civil 
Rights Movement had forced editors to employ more African-American journalists and 
thought that they would do the same in order to cover the women's liberation movement 
(Freeman, 1975, p. 113).  
 As a group who had chosen their name, The National Organization "for" Women, 
deliberately so that men could also be a part of ending sexism, NOW were unlikely to 
adopt such a policy. But the policy was quite an accurate reflection of some implicit 
essentialisms in the younger movement . The younger groups seemed to believe that 
women reporters would somehow, naturally, be more sympathetic because they were 
women. But they failed to take into account that women reporters also followed the 
conventions and "logics" of news. 
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 The younger branch's refusal to embed any media logics into their 
communications sometimes extended into outright hostility where women sabotaged 
attempts to "cover" movement events because they were suspicious of how that coverage 
would turn out. Male reporters were often harassed and sometimes subjected to physical 
abuse, though, ironically, it didn't seem to cure them of their sexism (North, 1970, p. 
105): 
  "Get the pigs out!" was the rally cry for a contingent of women who  
  last fall drove Doug Johnson, a WABC-TV correspondent away from a  
  Women's Lib meeting. "One of the girls smashed my microphone.  
  She was rabid, but she was a lovely little thing." 
But even sympathetic reporters found the younger movement difficult to cover. Marlene 
Sanders of ABC-TV (cited in North, 1970. p. 106), remembers the movement as a very 
hard story to get, and that covering the younger movement meant "fighting everybody, 
everywhere, all the time....  I am in real agreement with the Women's Liberation front and 
they're oppressing me."  
 Emblematic of the news-movement relationship in the early years was the non-
story of how women liberationists had burned their bras. News outlets all over the 
country reported and re-reported on how women in demonstrations had burned their bras 
as a symbol of protest against femininity. The (in)famous bras were of course never 
actually burned. Restrictive underwear including corsets and bras were thrown into a 
"freedom trashcan" at the 1968 Miss America Pageant in 1968, but they were never set 
on fire except in reporters' imagination (Martin, 1971; Klemsrud, 1974). The creation by 
media of burning bras became a shared grievance across all movement groups. Joanne 
Foley Martin (Martin, 1971, p. 11), a NOW activist,  explains how such fabrication 
alienated even the media pragmatists : 
  The women's liberation movement and bra destruction have nothing to do  
  with each other. No one in the women's liberation movement has burned 
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  or otherwise mutilated a bra. At least not in public.... This sort of publicity  
  if puzzling and upsetting to those of us who joined the movement because  
  of our concerns about serious problems of sex discrimination. 
 
 Controlling Communication From Within 
 The debate over the role of media in the younger movement reached a crisis at the 
1970 Congress to Unite Women where a proposal from the Class Workshop on "What 
can we do about the media?" advocated publicly censuring some women who had 
become media "stars" and enforcing strict movement rules to cover future interaction 
with media (Echols, 1989, p. 208):  
  1. Anyone who appears in the media has to be drawn by lot from her  
  group... The lot is to be rotating. None is to participate in the media 
alone... 
 
  2. Women's Liberation is becoming popular enough that they need us as  
  much as we need them. We can and must dictate our terms to them; 
present  
  prepared statements and refuse to give personal information. From now on  
  anyone who refuses to follow this policy must be assumed to be doing so  
  for her own personal aggrandizement.  
 
  3. No member of the group can appear as an independent feminist whether  
  for fame or for money... We condemn Susan Brownmiller and Lucy 
  Komisar [two feminists who had written extensively on the movement] for 
  seeking to rise to fame on the back of the women's movement by 
publishing  
  articles in the establishment press. 
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 The attempt to "censure" these women (and evict them from the movement) 
ultimately failed when the resolution was voted down, but it does indicate a strong 
response within the movement to control communication to media. Although they 
manifested it in different ways, the younger movement, like the older branch, were 
centrally concerned with internal control of movement communications to media. For the 
younger branch that concern was about who could speak, whereas with NOW it 
concerned what could be spoken about. 
 
 Costs and Benefits of Media Subversion 
 The younger branch of the movement seem to have recognized early on that their 
practices and philosophies were not going to merge well with news routines, and they set 
about making policies that they hoped would counteract that tendency. At meetings they 
would insist that only women reporters come, and that a diverse panel of women be 
talked to. On one occasion The Feminists even had a woman reporter sign a $1,000 
promissory note that would be forfeited if her article mentioned particular individuals 
(North, 1970, p. 105). But these policies did not take into account the restrictions under 
which journalists, even sympathetic women journalists, worked. The younger group's 
demands often seemed unreasonable and even paranoid to journalists, such that they 
would think twice about doing stories on the movement (North, 1970). 
 The clash was to some extent inevitable; the purposes and "logics" of journalists 
and activists were in fundamental conflict. To the "younger" branch, the media was an 
intrusion into their community and a problem whose demands could not be met without 
some conflict with their own understandings and articulations of feminism. To embed in 
their discourse journalistic ideas of "balance" or neutrality, or to have one voice and 
experience stand in for many would have meant undermining their own politics. But 
neither could the media be ignored because they would simply re-create the movement 
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from inadequate information. The relationship became one of avoidance, hostility or 
brave, but unrealistic, attempts to change media practices.  
 
(IN)CONCLUSION: NEWS AS A POLITICAL RESOURCE, NEWS AS 
CULTURAL CAPITAL 
 The "older" and "younger" branches of the movement had quite different 
interactions with journalists and quite different understandings of news as a political 
resource.  
 NOW had a pragmatic and strategic relationship with news media; they tried to 
build relationships with women journalists, and their activities were usually organized 
with an eye to media. Indeed, if local activists actually followed the advice of NOW's 
media "kits," then media “logic” was encoded into their planning and communications 
from the beginning. 
  NOW’s approach did get the organization into the news columns. In the elite 
press they became "expert sources" in an informal and narrow beat of "women's issues." 
They became one of the key voices in the building of an informal “women’s issue” policy 
agenda. But their media-centric strategizing cost them in resources and time, as well as in 
freedom to articulate more inclusive feminism(s). Being media-savvy meant encoding 
news discourse categories and limitations into their own articulations. 
 The younger branch had a more fraught relationship with news. Their attempts to 
produce egalitarian organizational forms ran counter to journalist’s search for “leaders” 
to whom they could attribute statements about the movement. And their focus on 
“personal politics” (Evans, 1979), on issues of power and sexuality, was sometimes 
difficult for reporters and editors to understand as politics at all (Simpson, 1979).   
 The outcome of the younger branch’s chosen identity and strategies is less clear. 
Early and partial accounts of coverage of the movement suggest that in the early years the 
younger movement was ridiculed or ignored19  But it is clear that the younger movement 
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groups understood news, not as a resource as NOW had, but as a problematic  part of the 
system they opposed overall. 
 These two quite different experiences of the movement “branches” raise questions 
not only about what kind of a resource news might be, or to whom it may be available, 
but more generally about the forms of knowledge that can be communicated widely in a 
media saturated society.  
 Clearly a group's media strategies are tied to its political identity more generally. 
But we cannot conclude, as Gitlin (1980, p. 281) might, that because the younger branch 
was “radical” they were represented in a marginalizing way, or that because NOW were 
“liberal” their issues were incorporated. Rather, the different political identities and 
organizational forms of the two branches of the movements, prestructured their possible 
choices in interactions with journalists. Their media strategies intervened between any 
“given” identity and any “given” representation.  
 What is at work here is a subtle discursive process of struggle over forms of 
knowledge, in particular over what forms of knowledge can be “carried” adequately by 
news, and so make it into the public sphere. NOW decided that their concerns could be 
expressed in news discourse and often restricted their own discourse so that it would be 
carried by news. The younger branch found that their non-hierarchical, focus on issues of 
“personal politics” would not “carry.”  
 Ericson et al.’s (1989) conceptualization of news as a form of authority or 
“cultural capital” seems to be at work here for NOW. They saw access to mainstream 
news as an important goal that would get their issues and concerns out to the public, 
while at the same time gaining them legitimacy as a spokesperson for feminism in the 
public sphere. But for the younger movement -- who were at best ambivalent about the 
value of legitimacy in the public sphere -- news was not a form of “capital.” They saw the 
media's representation of them as a form of power, but they often chose for themselves 
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another form of capital -- "counter-cultural capital" -- which gained them power within 
the movement rather than outside.  
 News, like signification, or knowledge more generally, is a resource, then, but it is 
a resource whose strategic use requires that sources articulate their experiences within its 
terms. Like other forms of discourse, news is a system of meaning, one that comes with 
its own encoded and implicit assumptions about reality. Using that discourse constrains 
what it is possible to say. 
 This conclusion raises two different types of questions for social movements and 
other critical sources. First, is the question of whether movements can use news discourse 
as it currently exists for their own purposes. As this case study has suggested, the answer 
to this question involves calculations about resource investments and about the 
ideological constraints of being “translated” through news that can only be answered 
within a specific interactive context by concrete historical actors. We need many more 
examples of such strategic interactions.  
 The second type of question for movements and other critical sources that the 
discussion raises is more historical. It asks -- can interacting with news change news 
itself?  Because news discourse is  a system of meaning, it is also flexible and shifting, 
and its strategic use by critical sources may result in changing the discourse itself. So that 
even if short term interactions are frustrating, there may be longer term gains for critical 
sources. 20  
 Answering these questions requires that we know much more about how specific 
movement organizations and discourses have fared in interaction with news, and how 
those interactions change both sets of actors. Such interactions are likely to be highly 
complex and are certainly historically contingent. But it is only through looking at many 
such instances that we can generalize and begin to adequately theorize media-movement 
interactions and to understand news as a political resource (or not) for social change. This 
case study is offered as a contribution to that growing critical literature. 
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     NOTES 
 1 The historical papers of the National Organization for Women are archived at 
the Schlesinger Library for Women in History, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
 2 Gitlin’s (1980) study does present SDS leaders as quite reflexive and subtle in 
their political analyses, and perhaps over time their media strategies and media 
representation would have developed differently. However, his conclusion is clear in that 
he asserts that news media will always  play a hegemonic role and will always trivialize 
“real” opposition. 
 3 Ryan describes the day-to-day strategic communication practices, or "framing 
contests" of a Boston labor union, Local 26, and a citizen action group, the New Bedford 
Delegation, and concludes that though the relationship is a struggle, it is not a closed or 
hopeless one.  
 4 As Hall (1977) has note, one of the key aspects of hegemonic processes is that 
they are never stable; they always have to be maintained strategically by dominant 
discourses and actors. This also means that they are always open to challenge. Giddens’ 
idea of reflexive monitoring and use of constraints as resources (1984) offers a 
framework for understanding how strategic counter-hegemonic activities might be 
understood. 
 5 Goffman's (1966, p. 137) conceptualization of strategic interaction  involves the 
formation of a subsequent interaction based on information gained from the  previous 
one, which is to say that agents learn from responses to their past communications and 
encode that information into their next strategic "move. “ Giddens (1984) has used this 
idea of reflexive monitoring to inform theories of social formation and change. Habermas 
(1984) draws on ideas of strategic interaction in contrast to “communicative action,” in 
which the goal is not strategic control but understanding. 
 
 
36 
                                                                                                                                            
 6  Other writers on the movement have labeled the breakdown as one between 
“liberal” and “radical” groups, but I have used Freeman’s classification because it is more 
descriptive and less pejorative. As she points out, using liberal vs. radical labels for the 
movement can be largely a matter of the writer’s opinion, and may have little to do with 
how the groups would identify themselves. NOW, for example, widely cited as “liberal” 
in the liberal-radical dichotomy see themselves as “militants,” even though often that 
militance is tempered by pragmatism. As Freeman notes, then and now, differences 
between feminist groups are not easily captured by traditional left-right labels. Many 
feminist groups want radical changes in the relationships between the sexes, 
economically, socially and politically, but have different strategic plans for how these can 
be brought about.   
 7 NOW (1966) Statement of Purpose. NOW papers, Schlesinger Library for 
Women in History, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 8 NOW, (1968). Public Relations Guidelines for NOW Members and Chapters. 
NOW Collection at Schlesinger Library for Women in History, Radcliffe College, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
 9 NOW (1971). Press Handbook, written by Lucy Komisar, revised by Toni 
Carabillo, NOW vice-presidents for Public Relations. NOW Collection  at Schlesinger 
Library. 
 10  NOW, (1971), p. 5 
 11 NOW, (1971), p. 10 
 12  Papers in the NOW Public Information Office document a short lived attempt 
by NOW to produce their own “women’s issue” press mailing on a regular basis, called 
the NOW News Service. Although feedback from editors around the country was 
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positive, and much of the material was used by small papers, NOW had to discontinue 
the service due to resource issues and shifts in organizational priorities.  
 13 The press packages represented considerable investment of time, skills and 
resources. The "NOW Right to Choose Kit" from 1974, for example, included an analysis 
of groups for and against abortion rights; an analysis of the 93rd congress positions on 
the issue; background on abortion legislation and cases; contact numbers of NOW's task 
force members on abortion;  information from Planned Parenthood (another advocacy 
organization) and so on. In later years the press packs became even more sophisticated 
with an ERA pack in 1980 that was said to be widely used by reporters all over the 
country. 
 14 And in fact it was many of these same reporters who, with NOW’s help, sued 
their employer The New York Times for sexual discrimination in hiring and promotion in 
the mid 1970s. See Robertson (1992) for an account of this struggle.  
 15 Papers of the Public Information Office 1973-1975. NOW Collection, 
Schlesinger Library. Such analysis is labor and organizationally intensive and is unlikely 
to be undertaken regularly by any but the richest sources, however. 
 16  See for example Ericson et al.’s (1989) description of how bureaucracies 
control their information exchanges with media workers. 
 17 NOW (1968), p. 2 
 18 For example, NOW these days is widely seen as a pro-lesbian organization, and 
fighting discrimination on the basis of sexual identity is one its main tasks.  
 19 There have been some reports of news coverage of the movement, but they 
conflict on how the movement was covered. Morris (1972), for example, says that the 
movement was subject to a media "blackout."  Hole and Levine (1972) suggest that 
negative coverage of the movement was rife and that early movement activities were 
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ridiculed. Freeman (1975) hints at a distinction between the coverage of the younger and 
older branches, but does not really elaborate. To date there has not been an extensive, 
systematic study of the coverage of the movement over time.   
 20 There has been some speculation, for example (though less empirical 
demonstration) , that feminists have had effects on news discourse. The routine use of 
such terms and categories as “sexism,” “sexual harassment,” “pro-choice,” and even 
“women’s issues,” with all its attendant problems, for example, can be seen to be the 
results of ongoing strategic communication by feminists that have changed news 
categories. 
